I.  Introduction
        A.  The issue of whether people are free or merely automatons determined to be and do what they are and what they do is one of the most interesting and difficult issues in philosophy and religion.  It is an issue which attracts the attention of both novices and those who have studied philosophy and religion for a long time.  Could I (or anyone) be
different from what we are?  Could I (or anyone) have done anything but what in fact we have done?  And if one could not have been or done something else, how could it make sense to hold people responsible for what they have done?
        B.  The free-will issue is very complex because it involves so many other difficult and complex philosophical issues.

II.  One difficult related issue is the nature of causation generally.  Is every event which occurs bound and determined to occur exactly as it does?
        A.  Are there some absolutistic "laws of nature" which describe how all events, given the antecedent conditions, must occur precisely as they do?  Is the classical scientific view, sometimes called "the billiard-ball view of the universe" or "absolutistic mechanistic determinism," a true account of how nature works?
        B.  Or is the more modern alternative view on the nature of causation, "probabilistic mechanistic determinism," a better way of looking at causation?  According to this view, it is still the case that all events occur in accord with the laws of nature, but those laws are now viewed as probabilistic descriptive statements about what has usually happened in the
past rather than as absolutistic prescriptive statements about what must happen in the future.
        C.  Einstein, rejecting the view of many other scientists, continued to his death to believe that "God doesn't throw dice," that is, to believe that things must be as they are.  On the other hand, most scientists now have generally accepted the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle that, at least with sub-atomic particles, one cannot predict exactly where a particular particle will go.  One can give only a range of probabilities about its future location.  The laws of nature are viewed as probabilistic rather than absolutistic.
        D.  But is that "looseness" in the behavior of subatomic particles really there, or is it merely a reflection of our ignorance about the actual situation?  We know that in many situations we cannot predict exactly what will happen because we lack sufficient infor-mation about the laws of nature or about all the antecedent conditions.  Might this not
still be the case with the subatomic particles?  Might it not be that if our knowledge were more complete, we would not be limited to probabilistic predictions even with regard to subatomic particles?
        E.  But if there is absolutely no looseness at all in the universe as the absolutistic mechanistic determinist believes, then whatever now exists (including me and my actions) was bound to exist from the very beginning of the universe.  Each succession of events must occur just as it does.  Nothing could be other than as it is.  But that seems preposterous.
It presents us with a "closed universe" rather than an open future.
        F.  On the other hand, even the probabilistic deterministic view suggests that events are to some extent a result of chance, and what could it mean to say that something happens "by chance"?  If all the antecedent conditions in two situations are exactly the same, why and how could there possibly be different results?  Could all the prior condi-tions be exactly the same and yet be followed by different outcomes.  It seems that something must have been different or the results would have been the same.

 II.  Another issue is whether there is some kind of "soul" or "mind" or "immaterial mental substance" which is not constrained by the same laws of nature which determine the behavior of material substance.  According to one widely accepted view, I am free when my behavior is caused by the activity of my non-material mind rather than by the events occurring in my body, which are physically determined.  In the history of philosophy this dualistic mind-body view is associated with the French philosopher Rene Descartes.
        A. One difficulty for this dualistic view is to understand how an immaterial thing like a mind could make a material thing move or do anything.  It is also a problem in the other direction.  How could changes in material substance produce changes in something immaterial like thoughts?  How can the mental and the physical influence one another?
                1.  Related to this supposition that an immaterial soul exists are many other in-teresting issues such as when this supposed immaterial soul begins to exist, how you can determine if such a soul has yet begun to exist, whether animals other than humans have immaterial souls, and whether all immaterial human souls are basically the same or are
in some way different from one another.
        B.  Nevertheless one could argue that though interactions between one's material body and one's immaterial soul seem mysterious, we still observe that such interactions occur with some regularity.  I can make my fingers and arms move by thinking that I want them to move.  And in the other direction, it seems that feelings of warmth or pain are caused by changes in my physical body.  Research indicates that people who are deprived of food dream more about food.  Drugs can have an effect on our feelings, and electrical stimulation of certain parts of the brain produce particular thoughts.
        C.  Consequently, a new difficulty occurs for this dualistic view. It seems that the same kinds of laws of nature which describe the regularities in the physical world apply also to the interactions between the physical and mental.  Apparently, mind-body inter-actions are just as determined by causal laws as are events in the physical world.  So why call actions "free" just because they are caused by the mind, as if the mind itself was not also conditioned to be as it is by the laws of nature?

III.  A third issue related to the free-will problem is whether the determinism-vs.-indeterminism distinction at the center of the first two issues just discussed is in any way relevant to the notion of being a free person.  How is the term "free choice" related to the determinism-indeterminism issue, and how in turn is that related to being accountable for what one does.  Is it the case that a "free choice" is the same as an undetermined or unpredictable choice?  If that were so, would it
make sense to hold people responsible for such choices since those choices would be the result of chance rather than some feature of the person who is doing the choosing?
        A.  I want to show how this view that the term "free choice" is equivalent to "undeter-mined choice" is untenable, that such a notion of "freedom" is not compatible with our usual notions of when to hold people responsible for what they do.
        B.  To illustrate this point I want you to use your imagination. Imagine that you are a contestant on a quiz show.  There are two prizes you might win, a thirty-thousand-dollar automobile or a three-dollar ball pen. In front of you are two buttons that can be pushed, one labeled "A" and one labeled "B."  Your prize will depend on which button you push.  The
quiz-master indicates that perhaps pushing the button labeled "A" will win you the auto, but he also indicates that it may not.  It may be that you need to push the button labeled "B" to get the auto.  You are not being told which button wins which prize because then your choice would be determined or predictable and consequently not "free."  If you knew which button stood for which prize you would undoubtedly choose whichever button would win the auto.  Your choice would be determined and predictable rather than undetermined and unpredictable, that is, "free."
                1.  At this point you might protest that you need to know which button stands for which prize in order to make a "free choice."  But the quiz-master objects.  In order for your choice to be really "free" (in the sense of unpredictable) there must be no cause or reason for selecting one button rather than the other.
                2.  So let's suppose that you push button "B."  You then learn that the prize for that button is the ball pen.  You might complain again that the situation was unfair because you weren't told which button stood for which prize.  Your choice may have been undetermined but that is hardly what one usually thinks of as a "free choice."  That is, to define a
"free choice" as an "undetermined choice" is wrong.  That's not how we use the word "free" in ordinary everyday language.
                3.  The point about accountability is also clarified by this incident on the quiz show.  Suppose that your friends get on you after the show saying, "You numbskull!  You had a chance to win a thirty-thousand-dollar auto and you wound up with a three-dollar ball pen."You would certainly deny responsibility.  You would say, "I couldn't help
it."
        C.  To clinch the point that "free and accountable" does not mean "undetermined," let us return to the quiz show and modify a few things. Let us suppose that this time you are told that the "A" button is for the auto and the "B" button is for the ball pen.  But this time the quiz-master wants to make a different point.  This time the object is to show that you
are just a robot, an automaton, whose behavior is completely predictable. It is predicted that you will push the "A" button to get the auto.
                1.  So you push the "A" button and win the auto.  The quiz-master may crow all he wants that you are just a robot acting in a totally predictable way, but you don't care.  You have chosen the prize you preferred.  You made a "free choice" (but not in the sense of an undetermined or unpredictable choice).  "Free" must have some other meaning than "undetermined" or "unpredictable."
                2.  Furthermore, suppose now that your friends get on you saying, "You robot.  You automaton.  You did just what everyone said you would do."  What is your response?  You take responsibility for your action.  You defend it.  You say, "Sure, I did what was predicted, but that was what I wanted to do.  I have a thirty-thousand-dollar auto instead of a three-dollar ball pen."
        D.  I think that these imaginary quiz-show incidents prove beyond all doubt that in everyday language and thought "free and accountable" does not mean the same thing as "undetermined" or "unpredictable."
        E.  But we still have the problem of saying what "free and accountable" does mean, and that takes us to our next issue.

IV.  A fourth issue is the need to differentiate between "being free" in the sense of being free to act in accord with what one has decided to do and "being free" in the sense of being free to choose what one wants to do, that is we must distinguish between freedom of action and freedom in choosing.
        A.  Freedom of action consists of being able to do that which you want to do.  A "free act" is the same as what we call a voluntary act. This freedom is restricted or constrained by being in chains or by other things that physically keep us from doing what we want to do.  Freedom of action is also limited by what we lack.  For example we cannot fly like
birds because we do not have wings.  There are things that we can't buy because we do not have enough money to afford them.  Freedom of action can also be limited by government or other institutions which have the power to punish or reward us if we disobey them.
                1.  It is interesting to note that we are now thinking in terms of degrees of freedom (we are more free to the extent that we can do what we want) rather than the "free-or-unfree" dichotomy that ocurs when freedom is viewed as meaning "undetermined" and "unfree" is equated with "determined."
                2. Freedom of action is increased when our power to do as we desire is increased.
                3. To be completely free to act as we desire, we would need to be omnipotent.
        B.  Freedom in choosing is a less obvious affair.  What would keep us from making free choices?  Our example of the quiz game where we didn't know which prize goes with which button suggests that one thing that can keep a choice from being free is ignor-ance of what the alternatives are.  I need to know the alternatives.  And if there are more than two alternatives, then I need to know all of them and the probable consequences of each.  I would also need sufficient background knowledge to be able to evaluate the various alternatives.  I would also need the mental capacity to do this evaluating.
                1. Freedom in choosing is increased when we have more information and more capability of properly evaluaing that information.
                2. To be completely free to choose from among the alternatives in any situation, we would need to be omniscient.
        C.  Note that to be completely free with regard to both acting and choosing would be to become like God is often supposed to be, namely omnipotent and omniscient.
        D.  For humans to become more free is to become more powerful and also more knowledgeable and more capable of evaluating the information which we have.  These goals are being pursued by people both individually and collectively.
        E.  It is worth noting that freedom in choosing is much more important than freedom of action since it is the choosing that guides the action.  Power unguided by knowledge can be disastrous.
        F. The notion of "liberal education" (a "freeing education") is based on the importance of freedom in choosing.  I think that it makes good sense to say that liberal education is the cause of freedom and is essential to its continued growth.

V.  A fifth issue is the difference between the free-will/accountability issue in a naturalistic or secular context and the free-will/accountability issue in a supernaturalistic context.
        A.  Being able to act freely is the necessary condition for being held accountable for one's actions.  If someone could not have acted differently, if what someone does is involuntary, then it is ridiculous to hold that person accountable for what they did.
        B.  In a naturalistic context, the knowledge that people will be held accountable becomes a causal factor in their voluntary behavior.  They can avoid that for which they will be punished and opt for that which will be rewarded.  Parents and governments use this causal connection as a way of guiding children and citizens to do what is regarded by them as
desirable. 
                1.  But parents and governments use this approach of promising rewards and/or threatening punishments because they lack any other kind of power to contol the behavior of children and citizens.
        C.  In a supernaturalistic context where one believes that there is an omnipotent God who can send people to Heaven or Hell after death to reward them or punish them, the situation is quite different.  God is viewed as creating people to be as they are and then putting them in situations to test their faith.  They will be rewarded for eternity if they
do the right thing and punished for eternity if they do the wrong thing.
                1.  But an omnipotent God has made the people to be as they are and controls all the conditions which shape their development.  They are puppets.  It makes no sense to say that they are free no matter how often you repeat the mantra that God has given them free will.  They may be able to act voluntarily, but their voluntary actions are totally the result of choices and situations controlled by God.
                2.  Indeed many theologians have followed these thoughts to their logical conclu-sion and asserted the doctrine of "Predestination."  Since God controls everything, God also controls the basic genetic nature that each person has and the situations which the persons encounter that cause them to have the knowledge and attitudes they have.
                3.  When discussing this issue St. Augustine rightly argues that there is no incom-patibility between the notion of human free-will and God's knowledge in advance of what we will do.  With sufficient knowledge, God (or anyone else) can predict how someone will choose or act without causing them to choose or act as they do.  God can then save those whom God by foreknowledge knows will choose to believe or do the right thing.
                4.  But Augustine's arguments do not work so well with regard to reconciling human free will and God's omnipotence.  If God controls everything, how can humans control anything?  Augustine says that God deliberately restrains God's own power with regard to human wills, allowing them to choose as they will.  But on what basis will they choose?  God also determines what knowledge they will have gained in order to choose.  If they choose on the basis of the knowledge that God has permitted them to acquire, then God controls their knowledge and thus their evaluation of alternatives.  They have just the degree of freedom in choosing that God has allowed them to have.  The only kind of freedom they could have which God does not control is the freedom of indif-ference or chance.  Our discussion of the quiz show should make it clear that Augus-tine's kind of "free choice" is similar to that which the contestant had when it was not known which button determines which prize.  That may be an uncaused choice but it is not what we regard as a "free choice" in the way that that term is usually used.
                5.  This point is often made in popular discussions of the issue by asking with regard to the story of Adam in the Bible, "What sense does it make for God to punish Adam for disobeying if Adam, being created by God to be as he was, just did what God had caused him to do?  Why blame Adam?"  The situation is totally different from that of humans dealing with humans when the promise of reward or threat of punishment is the only means available for trying to control voluntary behavior.

VI.  A sixth issue related to the free-will question, and the final one I will discuss, is whether the highest kind of freedom consists of choosing to do that which will bring a reward instead of a punishment or whether there is a still higher kind of freedom.
        A.  Behavior in living things can be causally determined by genetically controlled mechanisms or even by unconscious habits.  It is generally agreed that such behavior does not warrant being called "free." That kind of mechanistically determined behavior  is more complex in living things but nevertheless not essentially different from what is found in inanimate objects.
        B.  Behavior in living things can also be controlled by the goal of attaining some desirable object or experience.  Philosophers and psychologists call this "teleologically determined" behavior.  Such means-to-ends behavior is not found in inanimate objects.  In humans it is associated with voluntary actions.  When we ask someone, "Why did you do that?", we expect an answer in terms of some goal that would be achieved.
                1.  Remember that in our discussion of what is meant by the expression "free action" in everyday life, we concluded that a free act is a voluntary act, an act that was done in order to achieve some end such as a pleasant experience (a reward).  An act is free to the extent that one has the power to achieve what one wants to achieve.
                2.  We also noted that a free choice is free to the extent that one's choice is based on the knowledge of alternatives which can be appropriately evaluated.
                3.  We noted that the behavior of children and citizens is often controlled by the parents and the government by giving rewards for good behavior and ignoring or punishing bad behavior.  It is expected that ideally children and citizens will voluntarily do what earns them rewards. 
        C.  But there is a problem here:  the behavior which is rewarded is the behavior that someone else (the parents or the government) thinks is good.  What if they are mistaken about what is desirable?  What if they use rewards to produce voluntary behavior which is not  really desirable even though the adults or the government may think that it is?
                1.  To attain the highest level of freedom, one must seek to do what one has decided for oneself is really good.  This may involve deliberately rejecting the values of the parents or the government or even the religious leaders who claim to have a special insight into "what God wants."  When a child, when uninformed, when still unable to deliberate well for oneself about what is good, it is probably desirable to follow the lead of someone, some authority, who should know better than one can know for oneself.  But eventually one must become an adult.  One must learn how to deliberate about important issues for oneself.  One must be able to say, "I no longer need to permit someone else to decide for me what is good."
                2.  This highest level of freedom will also reach beyond the notion found in many traditional religions that doing what is right will earn you the reward of Heaven and doing what is wrong will cause you to be punished in Hell.  Such thinking is a formula for being forever in the position of a child who must let someone else say what is good and who
seeks satisfaction from a reward being offered by someone else.
                3.  The highest level of freedom is where one makes informed choices to do what is good just because it is good and not because of some reward even if that promised reward is supposed to be eternal and is supposed to be given by a supernatural deity.